Hildo Hernandez is director, physical plant management, at California State University, Northridge. He can be reached at hildo.hernandez@csun.edu.

Soon after the dust settled on Monday morning, January 17, 1994 at 5:00 a.m., the earthquake is old news for most of the world. But for those charged with recovery and rebuilding efforts, this earthquake was a command to stand up and be counted. For some it was headline news, but for California State University, Northridge, it was the beginning of a "Time to Shine" performance.

Contrary to common perception, earthquakes exhibit different natures. Some earthquakes create a rolling motion, similar to shaking jelly, which span an elongated area depending on the subsoils and rock formations beneath the earth. The Northridge earthquake did not exhibit that nature. The Northridge quake had an up-and-down motion, concentrated largely in one area, and reacted similar to a power-operated hammer with a driving motion of successive similar aftershocks. This created a gravity factor called "G" forces, causing many structural support columns to mushroom at their bases and bolts to shear off. Buildings with different outer shells reacted uncommonly as originally perceived in a rolling motion type earthquake. There were similarities that caused damage in all affected buildings. For example, shelves were emptied. This type of damage occurred in stucco, brick, block, concrete, and steel buildings. The most damaged building at CSU Northridge was the parking structure that pancaked inward. Other buildings, such as the science complex, built of concrete, exhibited massive spalding, cracked columns, and extensive interior space damage. Fires resulted from gas and electrical lines being ruptured or broken by the hammer "G" force action of the quake.

When operating a command center, the damage to facilities is just one aspect of an earthquake damage control scenario to be considered by officials and facility managers.What is a command center? In both of the most recent major California quakes, the Loma Prieta in October 1989, and the Northridge in January 1994, specific sites were designated to house officials where decisions were made. Loma Prieta, in the San Francisco/Oakland area, and Northridge, in the Los Angeles area, each had centers fully operational and staffed around the clock within a few hours after the earthquake.

From the central location, all first responders and key personnel were able to collect information and direct search and rescue operations. As the situation stabilized, the need for the command center was phased out. At CSU Northridge, it was quickly learned that two centers were needed, one for operational services (logistics) and the other for administrative decisions and control. One of the most critical and decisive decisions made in the command center was not to close the CSU Northridge campus. This decision was made by President, Blenda Wilson.

Search and rescue for anyone in quake areas is the first and most important consideration to be addressed. There needs to be procedures in place and field decisions need to be made to command parameters and requirements that will be acceptable to meet Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regulations. Damage assessment should start as soon after as feasible.

Forms should be used in all instances to document information, assessment, value, estimated cost, inventory, corrective action, staff direct time, and overhead time spent on all earthquake work activities. This is a cardinal rule that must be followed to receive the correct reimbursement from FEMA at a later date.

To expedite procurement and human resource processes, CSU Northridge centralized the procurement, hiring of personnel, transportation information, and documentation in the operational command center called Operation Center. For example, letters of approval directing flexibility in these usually highly scrutinized functions, opened doors to purchase services and hire staff that allowed for immediate action.

Keeping a list of vendors outside of your geographical area is highly recommended. This type of planning gives you a shortcut to receiving needed goods and services that are necessary during the immediate emergency. Inventory quickly runs out when disaster hits, so it's good to keep a reference list of vendors and professional firms. For example, fencing materials are needed to secure areas and emergency equipment such as generators, barricades, lights, gasoline, water, and food are all essential during the first few days after an earthquake.

I know that $2 million was spent by Los Angeles County in the first week for temporary toilets alone. Fencing was so scarce that it was not an option, so guard services were contracted to secure the campus. Looting and vandalism is something that needs to be addressed. Campus buildings were secured by disabling the locks. Staff and faculty wanted to enter their building space and this required controlled access procedures. There were hazards and unknown circumstances that required us to control the access.

For example, we learned that loose asbestos posed a major health concern so that even buildings not "red tagged" were off limits until assessments came back as being clear of loosened asbestos. We encountered significant loosened asbestos that required a contractor to come in with trained personnel to deal with the problem. In California asbestos handlers must be certified in a 24-hour training course and fitted for facemasks, just to work with 100 square feet of area without additional training. There was no question that the asbestos clean up slowed recovery operations, and also added hefty costs to other already staggering bills.

Asbestos Handling
Characteristics: Requires expensive training, regulation, and record keeping. Difficult, time consuming, and labor intensive.

Direct Costs:

• Area preparation (moving or covering equipment and physical barricading to isolate the area).
• Removal and disposal of the removed asbestos.
• Re-insulation and/or replacement with non-asbestos substitute.
  
  Indirect Costs: (usually equals or exceeds direct costs)
• Operating downtime.
• Temporary measures during the removal operation (power, heating and air conditioning, overtime costs).
• Owner coordination and supervision.
• Contractor selection and/or evaluation.
• Legal review, processing orders, contracts, tallies, etc.
  
  Caveat: Estimates for removal can range from $3 to $40 per foot, with figures often covering only actual and not all incidental costs.

When dealing with FEMA, you must document, document, document! If any lesson was learned through these two major earthquakes, it was to know what condition facilities are in before an emergency arises, record it all, and keep every record. Disaster Survey Reports (DSRs) are not enough. Keep all your backup papers and do not delay, or you will not receive the reimbursement you are entitled to. FEMA and state assistance programs are good and welcomed relief, however, they will not cover all of your costs.

Beyond recovery is the aftermath of new regulations that require more resources than what was required before the earthquake. My advice is is to be a good scout. Be prepared, and do your best at all times.